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This paper identifies the determinants of macroeconomic forecasts (budget balance, public debt and 
real GDP growth), of the governments of the 15 EU countries. We have used the forecasts of the 
Stability and Convergence Programmes submitted between 1998/99 and 2008/09 and the European 
Commission’s. Results show that, in general, economic growth forecasts submitted by European 
governments are more optimistic than those published by the European Commission. The lack of 
accuracy of government forecasts is due to “misinformation” regarding the economic situation at the 
time of their publication. The differences between observed and forecast changes of budget balance 
and public debt are explained by the output growth forecast errors and the forecasts of the changes in 
the two fiscal indicators. These forecast changes tend to revise downwards the changes submitted in 
the previous Program. Therefore, the governments’ “bad intention” seems to result from their lack of 
commitment to the objectives of previous programs and it explains the recurrent delays in the 
implementation of their fiscal consolidation plans. 
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 With respect to budget balance and public debt forecasts presented in the Stability and 
Convergence Programmes (SCPs), it seems there was a lack of commitment to the 
fiscal objectives that had been established in SCPs submitted in the previous year. 
This result accounts for the recurrent delays in the implementation of the fiscal 
consolidation plans. 
 Forecast errors of real GDP growth are explained mainly by problems of 
"misinformation" regarding the economic situation at the time the forecasts were 
elaborated, but when one considers information from SCPs, it becomes clear that 
forecast errors are greater than when data from the European Commission were used. 
That points to there being relevant differences between the forecasts and the estimates 
generated by the two sources.  
 Countries with better domestic institutional frameworks publish more prudent GDP 
growth forecasts and have smaller fiscal deviations.  
 The changes that have been introduced in the 2011 SGP reform may overcome some 






The current sovereign debt crisis plaguing some countries of the Euro Area provides eloquent 
proof that the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) has been unable to accomplish the objective 
for which it was designed: that of enforcing fiscal discipline in the Member States of the 
European Union (EU).  
The preventive arm of the SGP requires countries to achieve medium-term budgetary 
objectives. The fiscal adjustment process to achieve those objectives is defined by 
governments in the Stability or Convergence Programmes (SCPs). Medium-term budgetary 
objectives should ensure the sustainability of public debt and give room for the stabilization 
of the economy in a recession context without violating the budget deficit limit. 
The existence of budget deficits above 3% of GDP in several European Monetary Union 
(EMU) countries in a persistent way between 1999 and 2011 shows the ineffectiveness of the 
preventive arm. This seems to have resulted from a systematic failure to implement the fiscal 
adjustment processes defined by some countries in their SCPs. Until the 2011 reform of the 
SGP, this arm had been an ex-ante fiscal rule. There was neither an ex-post verification of 
compliance with the medium-term fiscal plans nor sanction procedures in the case of 
unjustified deviations between observed and predicted values. Thus, governments may have 
overestimated the economic and fiscal forecasts presented in SCPs to ensure compliance with 
the ex ante required criteria. This strategy is described by the European Commission (2005) as 
“window dressing”. 
In this context, the study of macroeconomic forecast determinants (namely budget balance, 
public debt and real GDP growth) and of the corresponding forecast errors becomes relevant 
and is the major goal of this paper. In our analysis we have used the SCPs forecasts submitted 
between 1998/99 and 2008/09 by the governments of the 15 EU state members (before the 
2004 enlargement) as well as the forecasts of the European Commission (EC). The 
econometric analysis aims to identify the main economic, political and institutional 
determinants of those macroeconomics forecasts and their corresponding deviations with 
recourse to panel data models with country and time fixed effects. 
Our paper contributes to the literature in three different aspects. The first aspect regards the 
analysis of public debt. As far as we know, nothing has been published on public debt 
forecasts determinants and their corresponding errors. In view of the current context of the 
sovereign debt crisis and the causal relationship between the budget balance and the public 
debt variation, though, this analysis becomes particularly relevant and results for the public 
debt can be interpreted as a robust test of the conclusions drawn in relation to budget balance. 
Public debt forecast errors do not necessarily equal budget balance’s, due to a set of measures 
that are only considered in the calculation of public debt, but the existence of different 
determinants may ensue from the use of budget-debt adjustments (in some cases, to ensure 
apparent compliance of the budget balance rule). 
The second major contribution of this paper is the use of real time data from two different 
sources to verify the robustness of the econometric results. We have used the estimates 
published in the autumn of year t by the EC and governments’ estimates inscribed in SCPs at 
the end of year t and/or at the beginning of year t+1. EC’s estimates have two advantages. The 
first is that they are published regularly in October or November and are known by all 
governments at the same time, unlike what happened between 1998 and 2010, when dates for 
SCPs submission varied from country to country and from year to year, usually occurring 
between October and February of the following year. The second advantage has to do with 
estimates’ reliability. Because they are published by an independent institution, their quality is 
not expected to be inferior to official governments’ since the EC has no incentive to publish 
biased indicators. 
Finally, another important contribution of this paper concerns the real GDP growth 
forecasts. We have looked into the determinants of real GDP growth forecasts and those of 
2 
their respective errors, given their importance in explaining the fiscal forecasts and their 
corresponding deviations. Moreover, in view of the fact that some governments are likely to 
have deliberately biased real GDP growth forecasts, we have also used the EC’s autumn 
forecasts. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: section two reviews the related 
literature; section three describes the dependent variables and methods; section four presents 
and discusses the results of the econometric analysis; and section five presents the 
conclusions. 
II. Literature review 
In what concerns the relationship between economic and fiscal forecasts, some authors 
have drawn the attention to the possibility of governments having used a “window dressing” 
strategy, meaning they may have presented rosy output growth forecasts as a means to 
overestimate the expected revenue and forecast a greater volume of public expenditure (EC, 
2005).
 1 
The “window dressing” strategy is also convenient because underestimation of the output 
gap implies considering a larger share of the budget deficit as cyclical, which expedites the 
adjustment toward the medium-term objective (EC, 2008).
2
 
Empirical results confirm that observed levels of budget balance are below the predicted 
ones in the face of negative growth surprises (Brück and Stephan, 2006; Beetsma et al., 2009; 
Pina and Venes, 2011) and that more ambitious budget balance forecasts translate to bigger 
and negative forecast errors (Beetsma et al. 2009). 
Some studies have examined the contribution of political variables related to the partisan 
electoral cycles as well as to the degree of political system fragmentation. Brück and Stephan 
(2006), along with other authors (Giuliodori and Beetsma, 2008; von Hagen, 2010), have 
concluded that the bias of budget balance forecasts is related to electoral cycles. In pre-
election periods, for example, forecasts are usually more optimistic. Contrarily, according to 
Strauch et al. (2004) and von Hagen (2010), electoral motivation has no significant bearing on 
the explanation of real GDP growth forecast errors.  
Beetsma et al. (2009) conclude that political variables have a limited role in explaining the 
budget forecasts and their respective errors. Nevertheless, two important outcomes follow 
from this work. The budget balance forecasts are more optimistic when they are done by a 
recently elected government, probably because policy makers intend to signal the 
government’s commitment to the consolidation plans. Moreover, political instability and 
ideological changes, from right-wing to leftist government, leads to largest and negative 
budget balance forecast errors. 
The literature has also analysed the influence of the institutional framework on the quality 
of forecasts and their corresponding forecast errors. Concerning the supranational fiscal rules, 
governments running deficits above the limit of 3% of GDP usually plan a further fiscal 
adjustment, probably as a result of the implementation of restrictive fiscal measures (Beetsma 
and Giuliodori, 2008; Beetsma et al., 2009).  
The budget process can be centralized by two forms of fiscal governance: delegation and 
contracts. The governments operating under contracts have stronger incentives to publish 
prudent forecasts than governments operating under delegation, since surprises in terms of 
output growth and fiscal balance increase the need to renegotiate coalition contracts (Strauch 
et al., 2004; von Hagen, 2010). 
                                               
1The causal relationship may be in the opposite direction. Countries running higher deficits are more likely to 
deliberately present optimist output growth forecasts in order to subvert the fiscal rules (Milesi-Ferretti and 
Moriyama, 2006; van den Noord, 2007). 
2
Morris et al. (2006) claim incentives to underestimate the output gap in real time increased with the 2005 
SGP reform, because the budgetary effort has become dependent on the business cycle’s situation. 
 
3 
More appropriate medium-term budgetary frameworks and domestic fiscal rules imply 
smaller budget deviations. Budget forecasts are more optimistic, but forecast errors are lower, 
though, because of an effective implementation of the predicted policy measures (Beetsma et 
al., 2009).  
Independent fiscal institutions may produce macroeconomic forecasts.
3
 However, with the 
exception of Belgium, Austria, Netherlands and Germany, EU governments are free to use 
their own GDP growth forecasts and are not obliged to justify the deviations between their 
forecasts and those elaborated by an independent institution. Several authors advocate the use 
of GDP growth forecasts made by independent institutions in the preparation of budgets 
because not only are the thereof ensuing forecast errors smaller (Annett, 2006) but also 
optimist biases are not often found in the independent institutions’ forecasts (Jonung and 
Larch, 2006). 
III. Methodology 
We aim to explain the following variables: budget balance and public debt forecast changes; 
forecast errors of budget balance and public debt changes; real GDP growth forecasts and 
their corresponding forecast errors. 
Budget balance ( 1,
 t tiB ) and public debt forecast change (
1
,
 t tiDebt ) for country i in year t is 
the difference between the forecast for year t done by the government in the SCP (usually 
submitted at the end of year t-1) and the government’s or the EC’s estimate for the year t-1, 
published at the end of the same year.
4
 
The forecast error in budget balance and public debt change ( 1,,
tt





respectively) for country i in year t corresponds to the observed change in year t minus the 
forecast change in year t-1.  
Finally, real GDP growth forecast error ( 1,,
tt
tiEy ) is the difference between the estimate 
published in year t and the forecast presented in year t-1. 
We have used two sources of statistical information – the EC and the SCPs – for the 
estimates of the three macroeconomic variables and for real GDP growth forecasts. Thus, 
there are two different ways of calculating the forecast changes of budget balance and public 
debt and their respective forecast errors and three different ways of computing the GDP 
growth forecast errors. Table 1 presents a summary of descriptive statistics of these variables 
for the 15 EU countries over the 1998-2009 period. 
Concerning the forecast errors of the three macroeconomic variables, we have looked into 
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ti EyEDebtEBE . 
When the estimated coefficient  (corresponding to the average forecast error) is not 
statistically different from zero, the forecasts do not have a systematic bias. The estimated 
values of  and their statistical significance are also given in Table 1. 
                                               
3 In Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain the independent fiscal institutions do not elaborate forecasts. 
4 Throughout this paper, the lower index refers to country and to year of statistical data whereas the upper 




Descriptive statistics, 1998-2009 
Dependent 
variable 













 t tiB  165 -0.13  
0.97 















 t tiB  165 -0.22  
1.18 
















 t tiDebt  162 -1.21  
2.64 















 t tiDebt  162 -1.01  
3.57 






  162 0.74 *** 2.62 
Real GDP 
growth 

















  165 -0.56 *** 1.55 
EC’s estimates and 
SCPs’ forecasts  
Estimate 
t













  165 -0.59 *** 1.52 

















  165 -0.67 *** 1.69 
Note: *** indicates a statistical significance at 1% level. The mean and standard deviation are expressed in percentage of 
GDP. Mean forecast error estimates correspond to coefficient α in equation (1). 
According to Table 1, it is possible to draw two main conclusions: the estimated 
coefficients  are statistically significant, therefore the forecast errors are systematically 
different from zero; and the mean of forecast errors depends on the data source, mainly as 
regards public debt. 
On average, the forecast errors of the budget balance change are negative and near to 0.5 
per cent of GDP as a result of the observed decrease in the budget balance having been much 
higher on average than the forecast reduction, regardless of the source used. 
As concerns public debt, forecast errors mean is positive, but its value diverges 
considerably depending on the source. When using the information from SCPs, the mean of 
observed change is 0.2 per cent of GDP, meaning that the positive forecast errors reflect an 
increase in the debt while the forecasts suggested a reduction. Considering the EC’s estimates, 
the positive mean of the forecast errors reveal a debt reduction lower than expected.  
5 
Finally, the forecast errors mean of real GDP growth is negative by about 0.6 per cent of 
GDP, indicating a situation of effective growth which is systematically lower than what had 
been predicted, regardless of the data source. 
This study includes six models, one for each dependent variable. Since two different data 
sources have been used, the models are estimated according to three different specifications 
presented as follows: specification A, consisting of the definition and construction of 
variables based on estimates by SCPs; specification B, showing results obtained with recourse 
to EC’s estimates; and specification C, referring to the use of EC’s estimates and EC’s real 
GDP growth forecast or its corresponding forecast errors. The only exception here is the 
model concerning real GDP growth forecasts in which there are only two specifications based 
on governments’ and EC’s forecasts, respectively. 
As a starting hypothesis, we have considered a model with country ( iv ) and time ( tz ) fixed 
effects. The alternative of a random effects model was ruled out based on a Breusch-Pagan 
test
 5
; the utilization of a pooled OLS was considered inappropriate both in the case of budget 
balance and public debt forecast changes and of real GDP forecasts since the country fixed 




In order to ascertain the need for instrumental variables, we have analysed the endogeneity 
of the "real GDP growth forecast" variable in the case of budget balance and public debt 
forecast changes and of "forecast error of real GDP growth" in the models used to explain the 
fiscal variables forecast errors.
7
 Under the null hypothesis of the endogeneity test, the 
endogenous explanatory variable can be considered as exogenous. This hypothesis is rejected 
only for the budget balance forecast change and, therefore, we have opted for a model with 
instrumental variables just in this case. 
In order to examine the contribution of institutional variables related to domestic fiscal 
frameworks we have followed the procedure postulated by Beetsma et al. (2009), which 
consists of three steps. First, for each institutional variable we have computed the mean over 
time by country. Then, for each of the dependent variables, we have estimated the fixed 
effects by country of the regressions, including the significant economic and political 
variables. Finally, we have tried to establish whether the mean of each institutional variable is 
significant in the explanation of those fixed effects. 
IV. Empirical results and discussion 
In this section we proceed to present the models used to study the macroeconomic 
determinants of forecasts and forecast errors and analyse the results. As mentioned before, 
economic and political variables were first taken into account and only then have we moved 
on to assessing the effect of the institutional ones. 
A. Economic and political determinants and supranational fiscal rules 









































































  . 
                                               
5 Hausman tests also suggest that the random effects estimator is inconsistent. However, this kind of test is 
sensitive to the heteroscedasticity problems identified. 
6 For real GDP growth forecast errors the pooled OLS model results are also presented since the fixed effects 
for countries have no statistical significance; moreover, the estimated coefficients from the fixed effects model 
suggested that all the explanatory variables in specification C were statistically insignificant. 
7 The endogeneity test statistics is numerically equal to the Hausman test statistics under the assumption of 
homogeneity, although the first test is robust to violations of this hypothesis. 
6 
The models include country ( iv ) and time ( tz ) fixed effects. The first three explanatory 
variables are common to both models and are, by order in which they appear in equations (2) 
and (3), "real GDP growth forecast for year t", "budget balance estimates for year t-1" and 
"public debt estimates for year t-1”.  
The next three explanatory variables concern the fiscal variable in study and are designated 
as "excessive budget deficit or excessive public debt", "optimism indicator of budget balance 
or debt forecasts from SCPs" and "budget balance or public debt forecast change regarding 
programmes submitted in year t-2". 
Finally, the political variables are divided into three groups, depending on whether or not 
they lend themselves to examining the importance of opportunistic or ideological motivations 
and the degree of political system fragmentation.
8
 As far as opportunistic motivations are 
concerned, this section deals only with variable "regular elections" insofar as it includes 
elections that, at the time of SCPs submission, policy makers know will take place in year t. 
The other political variables regard the year when forecasts are published. 
Columns A, B and C of Table 2 present the coefficients for the statistically significant 
variables for each of the three specifications considered as regards the explanation of budget 
balance and public debt forecast changes. 
TABLE 2 








 t tiDebt  





0.392 * 0.478 *** 0.638 *** 1
,
t
tiy   
    -0.514 *** -0.670 ** 












tiB   
-0.730 *** -0.759 *** -0.698 *** 












tiDebt   
   -0.079 *** -0.072 *** 














         
(0.084)      





   0.446 ** 0.668 *** 1
,
t
tiOPFdebt   
-0.214 *** -0.692 *** -0.725 *** 
   (0.163)  (0.100)   (0.060)  (0.134)   (0.125)  
2
,
 t tiB  
0.355 *** 0.400 *** 0.320 *** 2
,
 t tiDebt   
0.463 *** 0.468 * 0.547 ** 
(0.117)  (0.117)   (0.127)   (0.149)  (0.223)   (0.222)   
1,_ tinewgov  
0.253 *** 0.265 ** 0.248 *** 
1,_ tipartygov
  
0.170 **       
(0.071)  (0.096)  (0.109)  (0.079)        
R
2
 0.80  0.84  0.86  R2 0.81  0.89  0.89  
N  150  150  150  N  146  146  146  
Notes: *, **, ***, indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
As regards budget balance forecast change, models comprise instrumental variables with country and time fixed effects. The 
"real GDP growth forecast" is instrumented by the "real GDP growth estimate for the year t-1", published at the end of year 
t-1 by national governments in specification A and by the EC in specifications B and C.  
Panel data models with country and time fixed effects for public debt forecast change do not include instrumental variables. 
Standard errors corrected by the jackknife method are given in parentheses.  
As expected, improvements in the economic growth perspectives ( 1,
t
tiy ) reflect themselves 
on more favourable budget balance and also public debt forecast changes when EC’s 
estimates are taken into account. 
A worsening of 1 per cent of GDP in the budget balance estimate for the year in which the 




tiB ) leads to a further fiscal adjustment of about 0.3 per cent of 
GDP in year t; the remaining 2/3 result in an increase of the public debt forecasts for year t. 
                                               
8See Appendix. 
7 




tiDebt ) are not statistically significant in 
explaining budget balance forecast change. In the case of public debt, its estimated coefficient 
is statistically significant when one considers EC’s estimates despite its low absolute value. 
These results are an indication of governments’ little concern for restraining the growth of 
public debt ratios. 
The "excessive budget deficit and excessive public debt" are used only for EMU countries. 
The variables have a positive value when the estimate of the fiscal variable published by the 
EC at the time of the forecasts elaboration indicates a violation of the respective Maastricht 
Treaty limit in year t-1. 




tiPECb ) is 
positive and statistically significant, showing that the more excessive the amount of the 
deficit, the greater the forecast adjustment of the budget balance. However, when the source 
data is the EC, this variable loses statistical significance. This difference between 
specifications may reveal an intentional behaviour from EMU governments in excessive 
deficit situation wanting to signal their commitment to the deficit rule.  






tiPECdebt ) has no statistical 
significance in any of the specifications. This seems to confirm governments’, EC’s and 
ECOFIN’s less attention to situations of excessive debt as compared to excessive budget 
deficits. 
The “optimism indicator of budget balance or debt forecasts from SCPs” corresponds to 
the difference between the forecasts inscribed in SGPs and those produced by the EC. The 
variables have a positive sign when the situation of public finances predicted by national 
governments is more favourable than the one predicted by the EC. The size and significance 
of the corresponding coefficients depend on the source of the statistical information. This 
outcome indicates there are differences between forecasts and also between the estimates 
produced by governments and by the EC which affect the size of budget balance and the 
public debt forecast change.
9
 
As regards the fiscal variable under study, and considering that SCPs are rolling and 
flexible multiannual budgetary frameworks, the variable "forecast change in the programmes 
submitted in year t-2” aims to examine the relationship between the forecast change in year t-
2 and the one in year t-1. The interpretation of estimated coefficients suggests a downward 
revision of forecast changes inscribed in SCPs that had been submitted in the previous year. 
The lack of commitment is greater for budget balance, probably because those plans are more 
ambitious in view of European institutions’ greater scrutiny. 
Most political variables are not significant, with two exceptions. Changes of party 
composition of cabinet in the year in which the budget balance forecasts are published 
determine greater fiscal consolidations plans ( 1,_ tinewgov ). In the case of public debt, when 
one uses estimates from SCPs, leftist parties tend to present more pessimistic public debt 
forecast changes than the right wing and centre parties ( 1,_ tipartygov ).  
The study of determinants of forecast errors of budget balance and public debt changes is 




















































  . 
                                               
9
 Castro et al. (2011) have analysed the government’s revisions of fiscal balance estimates and have 
concluded that the information published first is not only biased but also inefficient while budget balance 
estimates tend to be revised upwards. 
8 
Besides the "forecast error of real GDP growth" ( 1,
,
tt
tiEy ), which is common to both models, 
three explanatory variables are considered for the fiscal variable under study: the "lagged 











tiEDebt ), the “forecast change” (
1
,
 t tiB ;
1
,
 t tiDebt ) and the 














In order to understand whether changes in the political context are likely to explain the 
forecast errors, we have examined the political variables describing the governments’ 
behaviour in the year following the publication of forecasts. In the case of opportunistic 
motivations, the variables "elections" and "early elections" have been considered. The 
estimated coefficients for specifications A, B and C are shown in Table 3. 
TABLE 3 
























            









-0.989 ** -0.710 ** -0.771 * 
(0.093)  (0.096)  (0.132)  (0.409)  (0.301)  (0.366)  
1
,
 t tiB  
  -0.247 ** -0.277 ** 1
,
 t tiDebt  
   -0.319 *** -0.374 *** 













        
(0.565)  (0.242)  (0.235)          
tielect ,  
-0.418 *     
tisnap ,  
1.728 * 1.583 ** 1.264 * 
(0.207)      (0.934)  (0.730)  (0.658)  
tipartygov ,_  
  -0.135 **   
tinewgov ,_  
0.679 *   0.837 * 
  (0.058)    (0.375)    (0.456)  
tigapgov ,_  
    -0.210 * 
 
      
    (0.104)        
titypegov ,_  
-0.309 *     
 
      
(0.159)            
tichangov ,_  
  -0.383 ** -0.411 ** 
 
      
  (0.153)  (0.166)        
R
2
 0.60  0.65  0.60  R2 0.58   0.49   0.50   
N 150  165  165  N 162   162   162   
Notes: *, **, ***, indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The models are estimated with 
country and time fixed effects. Standard errors corrected by the jackknife method are given in parentheses.  




tiEy ) affect the implementation of planned 
budget balance and public debt changes, with most unfavourable consequences in the case of 
public debt. 






tiEB ) has only significance in explaining the forecast error 
of the budget balance changes when the estimates used are inscribed in SCPs. Therefore, only 
in this case does some persistence seem to occur. On the contrary, “forecast budget balance 
and public debt changes" (
1
,
 t tiB ;
1
,
 t tiDebt ) are only significant when estimates provided by 
the EC have been used. Their joint analysis suggests that, in the case of budget balance, 
negative lagged forecast errors partly account for negative forecasts when statistical 
information from SCPs is used. However, when the analysis is carried out with recourse to 
EC estimates, optimistic forecast changes imply negative forecast errors. In both situations, 
the absolute value of the estimated coefficient is between 0.2 and 0.3. The inverse relationship 
                                               
10
We have also included the "estimate for the year t-1" and the "difference between estimates for year t-1 and 
published in years t and t-1" for budget balance and public debt, respectively; nevertheless, these variables were 
removed due to their lack of statistical significance. 
9 
between the optimism of the forecast changes and their effective implementation justifies that 
the study of forecast error determinants also comprises the analysis of forecasts’ explanatory 
variables.  











shows positive signs when an unfavourable revision of estimates of deficit and debt occurs, 
and negative signs, when the excessive situation is more favourable than that thought to exist 
at the date of forecasts publication. For budget balance, the estimated coefficient is high, 
positive and has statistical significance in the explanation of the forecast errors. Its 
interpretation suggests that identifying a situation of excessive deficit which proves to be 
worse than initially estimated impels governments to undertake additional fiscal adjustment 
measures, resulting in an improvement of the budget balance that is higher than the one 
planned.
11
 Again, the same does not apply when there are unfavourable revisions of public 
debt estimates above 60% of GDP. 
The political variables with statistical significance depend on the data source, but in any 
case, the opportunistic and ideological motivations along with the political system 
fragmentation undermine the implementation of forecast changes of fiscal variables. 
“Legislative elections at year t” ( tielect , ) harm budget consolidation plans when estimates 
from SCPs are used and “early elections” ( tisnap , ), outside the normal calendar, contribute to 
an increase of forecast errors of public debt changes by at least 1.3 per cent of GDP. When 
estimates provided by EC are used, the estimated coefficients of political variables concerning 
ideological motivations ( tipartygov ,_ ; tigapgov ,_ ) reveal that changes from right-wing 
parties to leftist ones also harm budget implementation. The increase in the number of parties 
in government ( titypegov ,_ ) and the increase of “changes in government per year” 
( tichangov ,_ ) contribute to greater and more negative forecast errors of the budget balance, 
when SCPs’ and EC’s estimates, respectively, are used. Finally, a “new party composition of 
cabinet” ( tinewgov ,_ ) implies an increase in the forecast errors of public debt change, except 
in specification B.  




























  . 
The explanatory economic variables are, in the order in which they appear in (6), the "real 
GDP growth estimate", the "budget balance estimate", both for year t-1, the "excessive budget 
deficit" and the "optimism indicator of economic forecasts". 




























  . 
Four economic variables have been analysed: "real GDP growth forecast” ( 1,
t
tiy ), the 




tiDy ), the “difference 




tiDB ) and “revision of the excessive 




tiDPECb ).  
Regarding the political determinants of economic forecasts and errors, we have considered 
the same variables used to account for forecast changes and forecast errors of fiscal variables, 
respectively.  
Taking into account the results presented in Table 4 for specifications A and B, which 
concern forecasts provided by governments and by the EC, respectively, it is possible to 
                                               
11Pina (2009) concludes similarly. Inversely, the variable has no statistical significance in Beetsma et al. 
(2009).  
10 
conclude that all the variables are statistically significant in explaining the real GDP growth 





tiB ). These results do not 
support the use of a “window dressing” strategy to subvert the fiscal rules, i.e., more negative 
budget balances do not systematically lead to more optimistic economic growth forecasts. 
 
TABLE 4 





















-0.249  -0.275  0.018  -0.091  -0.136  -0.017  













0.792 ** 0.461  0.421  0.827 *** 0.512 * 0.378 * 













-0.082  -0.008  -0.001  -0.008  0.003  -0.036  












-0.319 * -0.481 * -0.471  0.107  -0.063  -0.427  
(0.054)  (0.054)  (0.166)  (0.261)  (0.318)  (0.169)  (0.245)  (0.536)  
1,_ tichangov  
-0.123 * -0.101 * 
 
                  
(0.058)  (0.049)                    
R
2
 0.94   0.91    0.71  0.69  0.78  0.68  0.66  0.77  
N  165   165    165  165  165  165  165  165  
Notes: *, **, ***, indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The models are estimated with 
country and time fixed effects in the columns A, B and C. Pooled OLS models appear in columns A’, B’ e C’. Standard errors 
corrected by the jackknife method are given in parentheses.  
More favourable economic estimates for year t-1 in one per cent of GDP contribute to an 
increase of economic growth forecasts by 0.5 per cent of GDP. For EMU countries, however, 
a worsening of an excessive deficit situation reduces real growth GDP forecasts, probably as a 
result of the need to implement fiscal consolidation plans. 
The "optimism indicator for economic forecasts" ( 1
,
t
tiOPFy ) corresponds to the difference 
between the real GDP growth forecasts provided by governments and by the EC. This 
variable has a positive sign when the official government forecasts are relatively more 
optimistic. Their estimated coefficients report that economic growth forecasts from SCPs tend 
to be more optimistic than the forecasts done by the EC.  
Of all the political variables analysed, only the "number of changes in government" 
( 1,_ tichangov ) was considered to be statistically significant in explaining real GDP growth 
forecasts. Changes in government in the year of forecasts’ publication to contribute to slightly 
unfavourable forecasts and are likely to be the result of governments’ intention to implement 
restrictive fiscal measures. 
With respect to real GDP growth forecast errors, estimated coefficients from models with 
country and time fixed effects are shown in specifications A, B and C. The "difference 




tiDy ) has a positive and significant 
coefficient in specification A, leading to the conclusion that downward revisions of economic 
growth estimates imply higher and negative real GDP growth forecast errors. This causality 
derives from the fact that, as it has already been mentioned, growth forecasts are more 
optimistic when the economic estimates for year t-1 are more favourable. The "revision of 




tiDPECb ) has statistical significance in specifications A and B; 
ergo, an excessive deficit that is actually worse than what had been initially estimated results 
in an observed growth which is lower than planned. For specification C, none of the variables 
are statistically significant. 
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Given these findings and as a result of country fixed effects having no statistical 
significance in any of the three specifications, a pooled OLS model appeared to be the best 
option. According to the results for specifications A’, B’ and C’, the "difference between real 





tiDy ) is the only variable with statistical 
significance and the resulting forecast errors are higher when the estimates and the forecasts 
from SCPs are used.  
Finally, the political variables are not statistically significant in explaining economic growth 
forecast errors.  
B. Institutional determinants 
The institutional variables associated to the domestic fiscal frameworks correspond to five 
indicators; these characterise countries according to: governance (delegation), multiannual 
budgetary frameworks (MTBF), national fiscal rules (rule), independent domestic fiscal 
institutions (institution) and forecasts produced by independent institutions (indprev).
12
 Table 
5 reports the estimated coefficients for the mean of each institutional variable.
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TABLE 5  
Institutional variables 
 
A B C A B C A B C 
iv  
de 1,
 t tiB  iv  
de 1,









-0.221  -0.545 * -0.436  -1.418 *** 0.162 -0.027 -0.102 -0.153   
(0.06)  (0.23)  (0.11)  (0.46)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.03)  (0.06)    
iMTBF  
 
0.747 *** 1.019 *** 1.226 *** 0.580  0.415  0.144  -0.493 ** -0.541 **   
(0.44)  (0.50)  (0.56)  (0.05)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.48)  (0.45)    
irule  
 
0.640  0.812  1.019  1.350  -2.270 ** -2.277 ** -0.533 ** -0.540 *   




0.151  -0.025  0.079  -0.788  -1.116  -1.174  -0.421 * -0.443 *   
(0.01)  (0.00)  0.00)  (0.05)  (0.06)  (0.07)  (0.21)  (0.18)    
iindprev  
 
0.451 ** 0.551 ** 0.527 * -0.547  1.540  1.420  -0.313 * -0.324 *   
(0.07  (0.06)  (0.05)  (0.02)  (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.07)    





tiEB  iv  
de 1,,
tt









-0.297  0.240  0.116  0.112  0.969 * 1.088 ** -0.154  -0.142  0.158  
(0.07)  (0.11)  (0.04)  (0.00)  (0.24)  (0.30)  (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.09)  
iMTBF  
 
0.912 *** 0.439  0.405 ** -1.331  -1.157 ** -1.203 ** -0.393  -0.319  0.030  





 0.190  -2.061 * -1.420  -1.376  -0.050  -0.017  0.191  
(0.04)  (0.06)  (0.04)  (0.35)  (0.18)  (0.17)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.05)  
ininstitutio
 
-0.331  0.114  0.203  -0.973  0.501  0.415  0.030  0.003  0.260  
(0.03)  (0.01)  (0.05)  (0.08)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.10)  
iindprev  
 
0.150  0.270 * 0.419 *** 0.183  0.334  0.060  -0.093  -0.017  0.028  
(0.01)  (0.04)  (0.16)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
Notes: *, **, ***, indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. OLS models present robust 
standard errors. R2 are given in parentheses. 
                                               
12 Indices regarding multiannual budgetary frameworks, national fiscal rules, independent fiscal institutions 
and independent forecasts were normalized to the [0, 1] interval. 
13 Statistical significance of institutional variables mean values cannot be looked into simultaneously, 
because of multicollinearity problems which affect the sign and significance of their respective coefficients. 
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In what concerns institutional determinants, we wish to highlight the following 
conclusions: 
- Countries with qualitatively superior multiannual budgetary frameworks and 
independent forecasts report more optimistic budget balance forecasts, but their 
effective implementation is higher. For public debt, the quality of the multiannual 
budgetary frameworks is not relevant in explaining the forecast changes, but it reduces 
the size of forecast errors in regressions with information provided by the EC. 
- Stronger national fiscal rules lead to forecasts of further reduction of the public debt 
when EC’s estimates are used and reduce the size of forecast error of public debt 
changes when the official government estimates are taken into consideration. 
- Governments operating under delegation publish more conservative budget balance 
forecasts in specification B and more optimistic public debt forecasts in specification A 
than those operating under contracts; conversely, they present higher forecast errors of 
public debt change in specifications B and C. 
- Except for the variable “delegation”, all the institutional variables reduce the economic 
growth forecasts. Hence, the domestic institutional framework quality decreases the 
output growth forecasts optimism. Nevertheless, these variables are not statistically 
significant in explaining economic growth forecast errors. 
- The "multiannual budgetary frameworks" stands out for the size of the determination 
coefficient (R
2
) in the regressions concerning budget balance forecast change and real 
GDP growth forecasts. The change of its respective index explains about half of the 
estimated country fixed effects. 
V. Conclusions 
This paper has explored the determinants of budget balance, public debt and real GDP growth 
forecasts and the corresponding forecast errors. The results from the empirical analysis allow 
us to make a preliminary evaluation of the 2011 SGP reform. 
Budget deviations are accounted for by the forecast errors of economic growth and by the 
respective forecast changes when EC’s estimates have been used. Budget balance and public 
debt forecast changes review the changes inscribed in the SCPs submitted in the previous year 
in a very unfavourable light. Therefore, the governments’ "bad intention" seems to have been 
the result of their lack of commitment to the fiscal objectives established in the previous 
SCPs. This fact is responsible for the recurrent delays in the implementation of fiscal 
consolidation plans. 
The 2011 SGP reform introduced financial sanctions in its preventive arm in case of 
deviations from the expenditure rule. It now states that public expenditure growth should not 
exceed the potential output growth. Since control of public expenditure is essential for an 
appropriate fiscal consolidation process, in the future this change may help minimise 
problems of implementation that may occur during that process. 
The optimism of budget balance and public debt forecasts done by some governments, as 
compared to EC’s forecasts, explains the forecast changes of the corresponding variables. The 
size and significance of the estimated coefficients vary according to data sources; this 
indicates there are relevant differences between forecasts and estimates originated by the two 
sources. On the other hand, real GDP growth forecast errors seem to be mainly the result of 
"misinformation" problems regarding the economic situation at the time the forecasts were 
elaborated. However, forecast errors are greater when the estimates and the forecasts of real 
growth of GDP from SCPs have been used. 
In the 2011 SGP’s reform, there was an intention of improving the transparency of the 
statistical information used in multilateral surveillance. The principle of statistical 
independence was introduced along with the possibility of applying fines to EMU countries 
which misrepresent deficit and debt data relevant to SPG. These changes should reduce the 
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size of budget deviations, since known estimates in real time determine forecasts and their 
revision significantly influences the size of economic growth forecast errors. 
Our results support the conclusion that governments’ economic growth forecasts were 
more optimistic than the EC’s and also that governments may have resorted to the “window 
dressing” strategy. Some authors argue that governments should be required to use EC’s 
forecasts or even forecasts done by an independent domestic institution. This option was 
neither adopted in the original version of SGP nor in its 2005 and 2011 revisions. 
Governments can still use their own forecasts although, since 2011, more transparency has 
been required concerning methodologies, assumptions and relevant parameters on which 
forecasts are based.  
With respect to the influence of supranational fiscal rules, the empirical analysis carried 
out leads to two conclusions. An excessive deficit at the time of forecasts elaboration 
contributes to more prudent economic forecasts, probably to meet the need for more 
restrictive fiscal policy measures. Moreover, the fact that excessive deficit proves to outgrow 
the first estimates encourages governments to carry out further fiscal adjustments which 
provides an improvement of budget balance higher than it had been planned. On the contrary, 
situations of excessive public debt were not object of concern. However, since 2011 the debt 
rule has become stronger, i.e., it is possible to open an excessive deficit procedure on the basis 
of debt criterion.  
As far as institutional variables are concerned, our findings point to better domestic 
institutional frameworks contributing to more prudent GDP growth forecasts and smaller 
fiscal deviations. Therefore, as long as Member States ensure that their budgetary frameworks 
are in line, with, at least, the minimum quality standards established in the latest SGP reform, 
one can expect smaller forecast errors.  
Overall, the findings of this paper are in line with the relevant changes introduced in the 
2011 SGP reform.  Future work could tackle… 
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Appendix - Data description and sources 







































































































































ti DebtDebtDebt  







 6011,11,   t tit ti DebtPECdebt  , if %6011, t tiDebt   
   33 11,1,1, 1,   t tit titt ti BBDPECb  , if 31, 
t
tiB  
   6060 11,1,1, 1,   t tit titt ti DebtDebtDPECdebt , if 601, t tiDebt  
B. Political variables: description and data sources 
- Opportunistic motivations: “legislative elections” (
tielect , ); “regular elections” ( tiregular , ) and “early 
elections” (
tisnap , ). 
- Ideological motivations: “cabinet composition” (
tipartygov ,_ ) and “ideological gap between the new and 
the old cabinet” (
tigapgov ,_ ). 
- Degree of political system fragmentation: “type of government” (
titypegov ,_ ) – size fragmentation; “number 
of changes in government per year” ( tichangov ,_ ) and “new party composition of cabinet” ( tinewgov ,_ ) - time 
fragmentation. 
The political variables were collected from the database published by Armingeon et al. (2009), except for the  
elections related variables. Such variables as “regular elections” and “early elections” are dummy variables 
taking the value 1 in the years in which elections happen regularly and early, respectively. Elections are 
considered regular when they occur in the year in which the mandate ends or when the anticipation not exceed 
six months. Otherwise, they are considered early. For these variables, we have used Golinelli and Momigliano 
(2009) database, which we have completed in this empirical study.  
C. Institutional variables (domestic framework): description and data sources 
- “Delegation countries” (
tidelegation , ) – is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for countries operating 
under delegation and zero for countries operating under contracts. The countries classified as “delegation 
countries” are: Austria, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Portugal and the United Kingdom. 
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- “Multiannual budgetary frameworks” (
tiMTBF ,
) – corresponds to the quality of medium term budgetary 
framework index by EC.  
- “National fiscal rules” (
tirule , ) – corresponds to the fiscal rule index by EC.  
- “Independent fiscal institutions” (
tininstitutio ,
) and “independent forecast” (
tiindprev ,
) – the independent fiscal 
institutions index was computed according to Kumar and Debrun (2008). This index is a simple average of the 
following criteria: 1) legal influence of the institution in the budget process; 2) independence from political 
power; 3) independent forecasts’ usefulness; and 4) perception of its effective contribution. The criterion on the 
usefulness of independent forecasts corresponds to the independent forecasts.  
